



Error Prevention Process Overview

Jim Allison
Error Prevention Lead,
United Launch Alliance (ULA) December
2010

Presented at:
The United States Air Force Space Safety
Council, United States Air Force
Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado,
December 6-10, 2010



Error Prevention Process

□ Objective

- Share ULA’s Error Prevention Process & Experience
 - ULA & Error Prevention Background/History
 - Error Prevention Specific Definitions
 - ULA Error Prevention Process Overview
 - ULA Error Prevention Publications
 - More Lessons Learned
- Questions are Always Welcome




Background: Who/What is ULA?

United Launch Alliance

- Formed in 2006 as a 50-50 Joint Venture Between Lockheed Martin & Boeing
- Provides Two World Class Launch Systems Operating as a Single Provider to the U.S. Government
 - Atlas V Product Line
 - Delta IV Product Line
 - Delta II Product Line
- Employs More Than 3500 Employees
- More Than a Century of Combined Experience in Expendable Launch System Production & Operation Providing Assured Access to Space
- Pooled Experience of Nearly 1300 Launches
- Legacy Reaching Back to 1950s

ULA Launch Vehicles



Great News!

Errors CAN Be Prevented



Identify the Hazards



Recognizing When Others are Taking a Risk is Easy

Recognizing When You are About to Take a Risk Requires Both Effort & Practice

STOP & THINK Before You Act


STOP When Risks/ Hazards Exist





Picture used with permission from thereifixedit.com;
There, I Fixed It™ is a trademark of Pet Holdings, Inc. © 2007-2010 Pet Holdings, Inc.



ULA Error Prevention History



TIROS Satellite Incident



- Active Atlas Reporting Since 2004
- Full Implementation of Delta Reporting Began in 2008

Definitions

Event: An incident that has a negative impact on production or launch operations. An EVENT is considered a potential MISHAP warning.

Mishap: An EVENT resulting in incurred costs over \$20K or consequences with high or significant impact.

Critical Mishap: A Mishap resulting in incurred costs over \$100K.

Support Organization Event: An EVENT that occurs as a result of a Support Organization's action.



EVENT




MISHAP

Definitions

AESOP™ Huddle: An Error Prevention technique used to ensure that all personnel associated with an operation are familiar with & understand their roles & responsibilities in the operation & that risks of failure are identified & mitigated.

Flash Notice: A preliminary notice to Executive Management & other personnel that a Mishap or Event has occurred.

Corrective Action Board (CAB): A board to ensure effective corrective action processes are implemented & closed. CAB evaluates issues/problems/products/processes & approves or directs corrective actions as necessary to remedy critical problems in a timely manner.



AESOP™ is a federally protected trademark of the Error Prevention Institute, Inc.
©2000 Error Prevention Institute, Inc., 888-0599-8715, all rights reserved.



Definitions



Perfect Product Delivery Ethic:

- Relentless pursuit of perfection to achieve excellence in everything we do;
- Applies our passion for Mission Success to continuously improve every process and product, to completely meet the needs of every customer; and
- Inspires and empowers all employees to dedicate our innovative talents to deliver program success and develop a world-class work environment.

Error Prevention Process Principles

- Achieve excellence in everything we do
- Continuously improve every process & product
- Develop a world-class work environment
- Deliver program success

ULA's Error Prevention Program is Founded on ULA's Perfect Product Delivery Ethic



ULA Error Prevention Process Technical Paper Available: Learning from Mistakes: ULA's Error Prevention Program by James E. Allison

Presented at the International System Safety Conference 2009

"The successful man will profit from his mistakes and try again in a different way." –Dale Carnegie


This Paper Describes How United Launch Alliance's (ULAs) Error Prevention Program Applies This Concept to Rocket Production, Test & Launch Operations

ULAs Error Prevention Program

- Recognizes Errors as Learning Opportunities
- Encourages Error Reporting Instead of Punishing Employees When Errors Occur
- Extracts & Shares Lessons Learned Company Wide
- Issues Action Items to Reduce Error Occurrence Company Wide

Each Reported Error is Tracked Through Resolution as Follows

- Root Cause Analysis
- Corrective Action Review Boards (CABs)
- Executive Management Review (Called an Error Prevention Council or EPC)



Published Copy Available

Identify the Hazards



Recognizing When Others are Taking a Risk is Easy

Recognizing When You are About to Take a Risk Requires Both Effort & Practice

STOP & THINK Before You Act

STOP When Risks/ Hazards Exist



Picture used with permission from thereifixedit.com;
There, I Fixed It™ is a trademark of Pet Holdings, Inc. © 2007-2010 Pet Holdings, Inc.



Error Prevention Process + Recent Expansion

Ongoing Voluntary Event Disclosures Via Workforce



Continuous Feedback Encourages Ongoing Disclosure:

- Company Wide Event Reporting
- Weekly Attention To Detail Emails
- Periodic Safety Bulletin Releases
- Error Prevention Web Site Access



- Error Prevention Process Principles**
- Achieve excellence in everything we do
 - Continuously improve every process and product
 - Develop a world-class work environment
 - Deliver program success

Flow



Event Reporting Process

Cause Analysis & Corrective Action Process

Corrective Action Board


Error Prevention Council Review Process

Share Lessons Learned Process

Flash



RCA



CAB



EPC



Share




...

Recent (2010) Addition

Analysis & Deep Dives


Metrics/ Reports



The EP Process is Designed to Share Lessons Learned from Mishaps/Events Across the ULA Enterprise

Error Prevention Process

A Few Key Concepts:



Prerequisites:

Error Prevention is a Cultural Change

ALL ULA Employees Attend a 4-hour "Human Error Prevention" Course Followed by an Annual ½-hour Refresher Course

ALL Critical ULA Processes Require an Operational Fishbone (to Identify & Eliminate or Mitigate Hazards)

ANY ULA Process Can Be STOPPED at Any Time by Any Process Participant


Basic Rules:

ULA's Error Prevention Process is Executed for Every Event

Events are Recognized as Learning Opportunities


Events & Mishaps are Pursued with Equal Intensity

Event Reporting Process



The Event Reporting Process is Triggered Each Time an Event Occurs

Cause Analysis and Corrective Action Process



Cause Analysis

- Performed at Site of Occurrence
- Performed by an Investigation Team
- Formal Causal Analysis Method
- Documented Results
- Identify Direct, Root & Systemic Causes


Corrective Action

- Goal = Mistake-proof
- Address Multiple Causes
- Target Systemic Causes


ULA Employs a Variety of Root Cause Analysis Techniques

Cause Analysis Techniques Employed By ULA


Root Cause Fishbone



5 Why Analysis




Apollo Root Cause



***The Cause Analysis & Corrective Action Process
Determines Cause(s) & Develops Appropriate Corrective Action Plans***

Corrective Action Board Process



ULA
United Launch Alliance

EVENT10-080
"Air Bearing Controller Fails"

Incident:
While moving the Payload Fairing half from the Vertical Assembly Building to the Special Cleanliness Area (SCA), the Air Bearing Controller stop function for the SCA cart failed. Personnel were able to physically stop the cart before it made contact with the building support structure and some line stock racks.

Direct Cause(s):
When the Off switch was operated to the off position, the contacts did not make electrical connection to activate the (air bag) brake.

Root Cause(s):
Facility personnel were unaware that the switch operated an air bag which served as a brake. This function was not tested during previous rework and PMPI.

Systemic Cause(s):
Errors; Verbal instructions passed down by previous personnel that had accepted the product and no designated area for Operation Manuals.

Corrective Actions:

1. Replaced switch and ordered spares.
2. Added operational instructions in PMPI

Lessons Learned:
Tribal knowledge strikes again. Because we did not formalize the PMPI by posting detail instructions, we had a potential for a mishap.


Flight HW Damage ?	N
Personnel Injury ?	N
If Huddle Held, Could it Be Improved?	N/A
If Huddle Not Held, Would it Have Helped?	N/A
Scope	<20K
Date	09/02/2010
Program	ATLAS
Location	VAB, Harlingen
Documentation	None
Part ID	EID 55-0515-89, AV027

File no. | 1

Typical CAB Presentation Format


CABs are Executed to Verify an Event's Cause(s) & Corrective Action(s) are Accurate & Appropriate

Error Prevention Council Process






The EPC Meets Monthly to Ensure Lessons Learned & Improved Practices are Applied Across the ULA Enterprise

Share Lessons Learned Process



The Share Lessons Learned Process Generates & Distributes a Variety of Error Prevention Data & Products


Analysis and Deep Dive Process



The Analysis & Deep Dive Process Looks for & Documents Event/Mishap Trends via Historical Data Analysis



Metrics Demonstrate Error Prevention Process is Working




Metrics Demonstrate a Measurable Reduction in Mishap Frequency & Severity



Error Prevention Metrics – Mishap-free Time Span Increasing


July 08 – June 09

ULA Mishaps By Month
July 08 - June 09



July 09 – June 10

ULA Mishaps By Month
July 09 - June 10



■ Mishap ≥\$20K Hardware Damage

■ Critical Mishap ≥\$100K Hardware Damage

- ❑ Events = Process Improvement & Learning Opportunities (Valuable Resource)
- ❑ Common/Consolidated Atlas, Delta Metrics & Evaluation Criteria
- ❑ Decatur Stand Down & Restart Activities (Including Implementation of 5S)
- ❑ Fishbone Evaluations of Processes & Procedures, Deep-dive Analyses
- ❑ AESOP™ Huddles (Assignment, Equipment, Situation, Obstacles, Personnel)
- ❑ Work Package Reviews of Denver Hardware Moves/Relocation to Decatur
- ❑ CAB Reviews (Local) & Error Prevention Council (Enterprise Level)
- ❑ Risk Index Metric helps Prioritize, Assess & Focus Follow-up Evaluations
- ❑ Weekly Error Prevention Awareness & Perfect Product Delivery Discussion Topics (LL & Successes)

**First 12 Month Period
with No ULA Mishaps!**
*(Last Mishap: 4 June 2009)

AESOP™ is a federally protected trademark of the Error Prevention Institute, Inc.
©2000 Error Prevention Institute, Inc., 888-0599-8715, all rights reserved.


ULA's Error Prevention Program is Working – Maintain Focus!

* 1 Sep Update – Event 10-071 (3 Aug 2010, Decatur Off-site Warehouse) COPV Fell from Transport Pallet Upgraded to Mishap Status



Error Prevention Metrics – Risk Index

ULA & Support Organization Risk Index Scores – 2009



Event Risk Index is useful in understanding and communicating the relationship between an event's actual impact and probability for damage.

Event Risk Index is defined as the product of an Event's "Actual Impact" and an Event's "Probability for Damage".

Probability for Damage: A subjective value representing a reasonable estimate of the highest level of damage, or disruption an event could have made had circumstances favored the worst possible outcome.

Probability for Damage		Event Risk Index Scores				
5	Damage Reasonably Expected	5	10	15	20	25
4	Damage Between Credible and Reasonable	4	8	12	16	20
3	Damage Credible	3	6	9	12	15
2	Damage Likely	2	4	6	8	10
1	Damage Unlikely	1	2	3	4	5
		Minor Impact	Small Impact	Moderate Impact	High Impact	Significant Impact
		1	2	3	4	5
		Actual Impact				

Actual Impact: An event's actual impact on ULA operations.

- **Over-reporting of minor events encouraged**

- Root Cause analysis and systemic preventive action over time eliminates program risk

- Eliminates future opportunities for minor events becoming more serious

- **Each Event scored for both Actual and Potential Damage**

- **Risk scoring allows focus on areas of higher potential (unrealized) risk**


- **Risk Index approach similar to Mishap Risk Index defined in MIL STD-882C , ULA SSPP, and ULA QS-453**

Risk-based Assessments Enhance ULA's Error Prevention Metrics



Error Prevention Metrics – Risk Index

- ❑ Event/Mishap Ratio Continues to Show We are Learning & Improving
- ❑ Overall Risk Index for 2010 Continues to Decrease
- ❑ 18 Deep Dive Packages Developed & Available as ULA Resource
 - Several Enterprise Actions In-work and/or Improvement Projects Identified
- ❑ Error Prevention Team Supporting Level-1 CABs for Events with Risk Index 12 or Greater as Added Resource for Causal Analysis Process




ULA's Average Risk Index is Decreasing



Error Prevention Metrics – Event to Mishap Ratio


Mishap Ratio = # of Mishaps/Total # of Events (for a Given Period of Time)

Reduction in Mishap Ratio Indicates Error Prevention Process Health




1 ULA's Mishap Ratio is Decreasing

Error Prevention Metrics – Increased Reporting Detail



2008-2010 Flash Notice Data Has Been Increasingly More Detailed/Specific
EX: 10:33 AM vs AM

Greater Detail = Greater Insight & Understanding



Improving Fidelity

Improved Reporting Detail/Specificity Yields Higher Fidelity Metrics



Error Prevention Metrics – Increased Reporting Detail

Example:

**Increased Reporting Detail
Helped the Error Prevention
Team Identify**

“Error Prone Zones ...”

**Error Prone Zone: “Specific Time
Spans That Have Demonstrated a
Higher Rate of Events & Mishaps
(Errors)”**

**The Error Prevention Team
Regularly Releases Bulletins
Alerting the Work-force That Error
Prone Zone Hazards Exist**

ULA Error Prevention Bulletin – BULLETIN10-xxx
Nov 2010 Page 1 of 2

ULA's Error Prone Zones - November 2010 Update

ERROR PRONE ZONES: are defined as “specific time spans that have demonstrated a higher rate of Events and Mishaps (errors)”.

BACKGROUND: When ULA Events and Mishaps occur, the ULA Error Prevention Team collects and analyzes a variety of data. Analysis indicates ULA Events and Mishaps occur most frequently during the two specific time spans identified below as “Error Prone Zones”. The purpose of this Error Prevention Bulletin is to alert ULA employees that Error Prone Zones exist ... and recommend employees STOP and perform AESOP 0191 huddles BEFORE entering them. (Ref QS-405)

ULA's Error Prone Zones - November 2010 Update

Time Of Day

FACT: ULA Events & Mishaps occur most frequently between 10:00 and 11:00 AM (local time). Event occurrence is also elevated between 1:00 and 3:00 PM (local time).

POTENTIAL TRAP: This rise in errors MAY correspond to a “loss of focus” associated with breaks and end of shift activities.

Time Of Year

FACT: ULA Events & Mishaps are more frequent during the months of August, October, November & December.

POTENTIAL TRAP: These rises in errors MAY correspond to:
 • “loss of focus” associated with summer vacations & holidays
 • lack of expertise / manpower during vacations & holidays.

ERROR PREVENTION TOOL: Use an AESOP 0191 Huddle before entering an Error Prone Zone to identify potential “traps” and ensure you and your team have the procedures, equipment, focus and manpower necessary to execute the specific tasks at hand.

Error Prevention Actions:


- **STUDY & UNDERSTAND** ULA's Error Prone Zones.
- **STOP & HUDDLE** STOP & Perform an AESOP 0191 Huddle BEFORE entering ULA's Error Prone Zones –
 - Specifically discuss the potential traps and hazards associated with Error Prone Zones
 - Focus On Assignment: understand task; do you have the right people for the job; do they have the right experience; do they have the tools and material they need for the job
- **ALWAYS MAKE SURE IT IS RIGHT**

Error Prevention Bulletins Communicate Specific Hazards



Error Prevention Metrics – Event Topic Tracking Feeds Deep Dive Analysis

Deep Dives Allow ULA Employees & Contractors to Access Historical Incident Data Based on Topic/Task



Note: Events May Be Categorized in to More Than One Topic; Lessons Learned May Be Common Over Topics

Deep Dive Analysis Identifies & Documents Common Hazards & Lessons Learned




Error Prevention Metrics – Deep Dive Example




Error Prevention Deep Dive ULA Crane Events 2008-2009

Error Prevention Deep Dive: ULA Crane Events 2008 - 2009						Cause Categories				
Event Number, Date, Location, Project	Event Name	Event Description	Causes	Lessons Learned	Event Status Database Link	Assignment	Equipment	Obstacles	Personnel	Status
2008-001, 1/8/2008, Harlingen, Atlas	Lifting Tool for Payload Fairing Cylinder Strikes Transport Cart	The PLF cylinder half was removed from assembly tool and was in the process of being loaded on the transport cart when its lifting tool struck a metallic support on the transport cart. The process requires two cranes and manual adjustment to properly load on the cart. Each process should have been done in separate sequences but they occurred at the same time. The effort from the manual adjustment was countering one of the crane's movement until the cylinder was released. This allowed the cylinder to swing thus the end of the tool struck the carts supporting bracket. Travel was under 20 inches and with light force.	Root Causes: 1) Person In Charge lost control. 2) Manual guides required on all 4 corners. 3) Required sequenced processes was lost.	In the AESOP Huddle held prior to the process the Person In Charge (PIC) needs to specifically state, "I am in charge, all comments are to be directed to me."	http://inside.ulaunch.com/org/qgass/ep/Lists/Events/DispForm.aspx?ID=122	0.5			0.5	Closed

2008-2009: Non-Crane Related Events Vs. Crane Related Events



AESOP Event Causes for 2008-2009 Crane Related Events



Deep Dives Document Historical Incident Data Based on Topic/Task

Identify the Hazards



Recognizing When Others are Taking a Risk is Easy

Recognizing When You are About to Take a Risk Requires Both Effort & Practice

STOP & THINK Before You Act

STOP When Risks/ Hazards Exist



Picture used with permission from thereifixedit.com;
There, I Fixed It™ is a trademark of Pet Holdings, Inc. © 2007-2010 Pet Holdings, Inc.



ULA Error Prevention Publications Overview



Error Prevention Publications Overview

- ❑ ULA's Error Prevention Process Generates & Shares More Than 200 Error Prevention Specific Publications Yearly
- ❑ ULA's Error Prevention Process Has Generated More Than 650 Error Prevention Specific Publications to Date
- ❑ Error Prevention Publications
 - Stimulate Ongoing Error Prevention Related Conversation, Awareness & Change
 - Are a Constant Reminder of ULA's Error Prevention Principals
 - Are Based on Actual Events/Accomplishments/Lessons Learned

Error Prevention Publication	Publication Frequency	# Published Yearly	# Published Since Inception
Perfect Product Delivery, Attention To Detail Emails	Weekly	50	170 +
Picture Of The Week	Weekly	50	40 +
Safety Bulletins	As Directed By The EPC	30 (so far in 2010)	80
There We Were Stories	Monthly	100 +	300 +
Success Stories	Monthly	20 +	60 +
Deep Dives	As Appropriate	Based On Observed Event Causes / Topics	20 +

Various Error Prevention Publications Drive & Support the Ongoing Cultural Change Necessary for Error Prevention Success



Error Prevention Publications: Perfect Product Delivery, Attention to Detail Emails

Objective: Provide ULA Managers with Weekly Error Prevention Discussion Topics


Release Date	Email Topic
2/4/2010	There We Were – EVENT09-093 2nd Stage Foam Damage
2/11/2010	AESOP™ Huddles Work for Non-Critical Ops Too
2/18/2010	Bulletin – Consider Trailblazers When Developing New Procedures Equipment
2/25/2010	Bulletin – Hold AESOP™ Where Task is Done

Enterprise Learning
EVENT09-093:
Second Stage Foam Insulation

There We Were... getting the work area ready to assigned task, we knew that the lighting in this that we had to move the rolling stool into locati set the rolling cart into position, it grazed the B damaging it .

We Learned... to always take extra precautions stands around hardware. We need to review w that restrain movement of people and equipmen hardware.

The AESOP huddle was held in the break room, more effective if held in the work area, where th have been better observed. The QS-405 check reflect this and the EP staff will issue a bulletin



AESOP Works For Non-Critical Ops

AESOP™ Huddles are helpful at all levels of work, not just critical operation

EVENT09-093: Contour Forward Adapter (CFA) Break Over Fixture Shaft Damaged, Atlas V, Denver, September 29, 2009. While setting up for the proof a new CFA Break Over Fixture, the fixture's main shaft was over-torqued and damaged. The gear box which rotates the fixture is counter intuitive. Turning the input shaft in an apparent "loosening" direction actually "tightens" the rotation shaft. This allowed the pre-torqued operator to easily and unknowingly over-torque the rotation shaft via an impact air g.

Systemic Cause: AESOP huddles are not always held for non-critical operations (such proof tests).

AESOP Would Have Identified The Following Red Flags For This Operation

- A – Assignment**
 - * No written procedure / instructions
- E – Equipment**
 - * New fixture
- P – Personnel**
 - * Tool Designer (expert) not present

Error Prevention Actions:

- **Hold** - AESOP Huddles for all operations, especially new/unfamiliar one
- **Discuss** - the use of new tools to be used in an operation during the Equip section of the AESOP.
- **Ensure** - everyone is familiar with the task at hand during the Assignment section of the AESOP.
- **ALWAYS MAKE SURE IT IS RIGHT**

TRAILBLAZER: Using non-flight and / or test a new procedures or equipment BEFORE processing

A Trailblazer is an effective and safe way to identify and of hazards in new procedures and / or equipment without pla risk. Events that occur during trailblazers yield valuable l allow ULA to prevent more serious and costly Events / Mi

TRAILBLAZER EXAMPLES:

Throughout 2008 & 2009, numerous Events were encountered durin a result, hazards were identified and eliminated from new procedure BEFORE normal flight hardware processing began. The table below operation and the Lessons Learned they generated.

Event	Location	Vehicle Or Mission	Event Description	Damage / Cost
09-068	VAFB	MMOL-41 Trailblazer	Ladder Hook Deformation	Damage GSE for
09-073	VAFB	MMOL-41 Trailblazer	Pin/Screw Caught in Hose	Explosion and fire
09-086	VAFB	See Main Stage PE Check	Connector Separated From Hose Cartridge	Explosion and fire
09-087	VAFB	MMOL-41 Trailblazer	Cracked Air Compressor	Explosion and fire
09-088	VAFB	MMOL-41 Trailblazer	Drive Wheel Lost Tty Chew	Explosion and fire
09-093	VAFB	MMOL-41 Trailblazer	Excess Heat Generated by P	Explosion and fire
09-094	VAFB	MMOL-41 Trailblazer	Excess Heat Generated by P	Explosion and fire
09-095	VAFB	MMOL-41 Trailblazer	Excess Heat Generated by P	Explosion and fire
09-096	VAFB	MMOL-41 Trailblazer	Excess Heat Generated by P	Explosion and fire
09-097	VAFB	MMOL-41 Trailblazer	Excess Heat Generated by P	Explosion and fire
09-098	VAFB	MMOL-41 Trailblazer	Excess Heat Generated by P	Explosion and fire
09-099	VAFB	MMOL-41 Trailblazer	Excess Heat Generated by P	Explosion and fire
09-100	VAFB	MMOL-41 Trailblazer	Excess Heat Generated by P	Explosion and fire

Error Prevention Actions:

- **Consider Trailblazers** - whenever new procedures are e procedures are modified.
- **Consider Trailblazers** - whenever new equipment is de equipment is modified.
- **Consider Trailblazers** - whenever the potential for dam unacceptable.
- **ALWAYS MAKE SURE IT IS RIGHT**

Hold AESOP Where Task is Done

Where is the most effective place to hold an AESOP Huddle? The following Event demonstrates the benefits of holding AESOP Huddles where the task is done.

EVENT09-093: Delta IV, CCAFS, 11/13/2009: Second Stage Foam Insulation Damage; During the performance of thermal foam repair, an engineer was positioning a roll-around stool in close proximity to the vehicle and accidentally struck the bond on foam insulation (BOFI) on the second stage.

Root Cause: Close Quarter Hazard - Existing work area environment leaves just enough room to position stool.

Contributing Cause: The AESOP huddle was held in the break room, and may have been more effective if held in the work area, where the close conditions could have been better observed.

Good Practice
Hold An AESOP Huddle

Best Practice
Hold An AESOP Huddle Where The Work Occurs

Holding an AESOP Huddle where the work occurs is a Best Practice. Holding Huddles where the work occurs helps ensure that all obstacles/issues for the task at hand are identified beforehand.

Error Prevention Actions:

- **Hold** - AESOP huddles where the work will be completed.
- **Walk-Thru** - the task at hand; obstacles and potential hazards may become obvious.
- **Identify** - all obstacles and hazards BEFORE there is a problem.
- **Ensure** - developed tools/processes are always used correctly.
- **ALWAYS MAKE SURE IT IS RIGHT**

AESOP™ is a federally protected trademark of the Error Prevention Institute, Inc.
©2000 Error Prevention Institute, Inc., 888-0599-8715, all rights reserved.



Error Prevention Publications: EP PIC of the Week



Error Prevention Publications: Hazardous Picture Of The Week - Sept 2010



ULA Error Prevention Hazardous Pic Of The Week



Picture used with permission from therefixedit.com; There, I Fixed It™ is a trademark of Pet Holdings, Inc. © 2007-2010 Pet Holdings, Inc.

How many hazards can you identify in this picture ?
Recognizing when others are taking a risk is easy.
Recognizing when you are about to take a risk requires both effort and practice.
Use AESOP huddles to identify and address risks **BEFORE** you start a task.



For more information on the AESOP Huddle Process, see QS-405 in the command media library at the following link:
<http://inside.ulalaunch.com/org/oig/cml/published%20library/qs-405.pdf>

Please Address Comments / Questions to:
james.e.allison@ulalaunch.com

AESOP™ is a federally protected trademark of the Error Prevention Institute, Inc. 82000 Error Prevention Institute, Inc. 888-599-8715, all rights reserved. 8/26/2010






Error Prevention Publications: Error Prevention Bulletins

Objective: Document/Share Identified ULA Hazards
Document/Share Suggested EP Practices

Bulletin	Release Date	Bulletin Topic
BULLETIN10-002	2/4/2010	Rotating Tool Hazards
BULLETIN10-003	2/10/2010	AESOP™ – Not Just For Critical Ops
BULLETIN10-004	2/10/2010	Consider Trailblazers
BULLETIN10-005	2/10/2010	Torque Lift Points
BULLETIN10-006	2/10/2010	OOP Hazards
BULLETIN10-007	2/18/2010	Hold AESOP™ Where Work Occurs
BULLETIN10-008	2/18/2010	Modifications Can Introduce Hazards
BULLETIN10-009	2/19/2010	Crane Hazard Identified

Note: May Require Closed-loop Distribution




AESOP™ is a federally protected trademark of the Error Prevention Institute, Inc.
©2000 Error Prevention Institute, Inc., 888-0599-8715, all rights reserved.



Error Prevention Publications: Success Stories

Objective: Identify & Share EP Successes
Demonstrate That the EP Process Works



! KAMAG Team Identifies "RISKY BUSINESS" Management Concur !

Potential Error: GOES "P" CBC moves on the KAMAG from the Decatur facility to the CBC Storage Facility. The KAMAG team was not comfortable making the left hand turn onto Delta Drive. It was agreed that after this move the concrete would be extended on the roadway.


Problem: On April 30, 2009, the KAMAG Team was asked to move another CBC to the warehouse. The concrete had yet to be poured to remove the risk of running off the road during this transport.

Actions: A meeting was held with the Decatur Senior Leadership and several KAMAG Team members. The Team stated their discomfort and asked, "How many more times are we going to do this one more time?"

Actions: A "STOP" was called by Senior Leadership. Decatur Facilities got re-engaged with the project. Flight Hardware was not moved until the new concrete was poured and cured. Now the transport is made safely with minimum risk to the Flight Hardware.

Lessons Learned: In most cases the risks we face are not so obvious, however one constant exists in all situations...the Pinch...that funny feeling that something isn't right; that voice shouting in our ears that we shouldn't take that path.

Max Santiago



Implementation Date: 6/2009
Location: ULA Decatur, Alabama



Error Prevention Publications: There We Were Stories AKA: Closed-Loop Reporting

Objective: Document & Share Each Event's Story & Lesson Learned Distributed Monthly to EP Distribution List



Enterprise Learning EVENT09-113

Support: Semi Truck Bumps Tool Dolly

- ❑ **There we were...** walking down the aisle in the Skin Ring and Dome area when I noticed a semi tractor trailer trying to maneuver in what appeared to be a tight space to work in. I also notice that there were no spotters in the front of the vehicle as it was moving forward towards a ring sitting on a dolly. I witnessed the tractor bump the dolly lightly however, the contractors were unaware of the contact. Now I'm not a Rocket Scientist by trade but I know that's not how we treat flight hardware here, so I immediately informed security about what I had just witnessed.
- ❑ **We learned...** while spotter use is common across ULA, no specific or uniform instructions or guidelines existed for spotter tasks, but there are now (ref QS-408 appendix C and Appendix B, Obstacles 10). Decatur updated D-206 to identify job specific duties and responsibilities of Decatur ULA and ULA Contractor Badged Escort/Spotters. An action was assigned to the EP staff to review ULA procedures for consistent spotter requirements.





- ❑ Topic: Error Prevention Deep Dives
- ❑ Focus: To create and maintain concise event information in which common groupings of events are presented together.
 - Equipment (Cranes, Forklifts, etc.)
 - Process (Transportation, Packaging, etc.)
- ❑ Reason: Allows ULA employees and contractors, based on interest or task, to access a brief summary of event groupings.
- ❑ Summarizes:
 - Event Details, Description and Causes
 - Individual Lessons Learned
 - Overall Lessons Learned



Error Prevention Deep Dive: ULA Crane Events 2008 - 2009					Cause Categories					
Event Number, Date, Location, Project	Event Name	Event Description	Causes	Lessons Learned	Root Status Database Link	Assignment	Equipment	Obstacles	Personnel	Status
2008-001, 1/6/2008, Hawthorne, Atlas	Lifting Tool for Payload Faring Cylinder Strikes Transport Cat	The PLF cylinder half was removed from assembly tool and was in the process of being loaded on the transport cat when its lifting tool struck a metallic support on the transport cat. The process requires two cranes and manual adjustment properly load on the cat. Each process should have been done in separate sequences but this occurred at the same time. The effort from the manual adjustment was countering one of the crane's movement until the cylinder was released. This allowed the cylinder to swing thus the end of the tool struck the carts supporting bracket. Travel was under 20 inches and with light force.	Root Causes: 1) Person in Charge lost control 2) Manual guides required on all 4 corners. 3) Required sequenced processes was lost.	In the AESOP Huddle held prior to the process the Person in Charge (PIC) needs to specifically state, "I am in charge, all comments are to be directed to me."	http://finda.substation.com/cgi-bin/asa/asa.cgi?cat=20080001&of=as&app=1&122	0.5			0.5	Closed

Category	Percentage
Non-Crane Related	93%
Crane Related	7%

Factor	Percentage
Assign	32%
Equip	54%
Obsta	14%
Perso	0%

Identify the Hazards



Recognizing When Others are Taking a Risk is Easy

Recognizing When You are About to Take a Risk Requires Both Effort & Practice

STOP & THINK Before You Act

STOP When Risks/ Hazards Exist



Picture used with permission from thereifixedit.com;
There, I Fixed It™ is a trademark of Pet Holdings, Inc. © 2007-2010 Pet Holdings, Inc.





ULA Error Prevention Lessons Learned Collected Examples



ATLAS System Safety Error Prevention Success Story

Potential Error: Fork Lift Pierces Crate & Damages Flight HW

NM07-009, 1/31/2007: A fuel duct flange was damaged when a fork lift penetrated a transportation crate.



Mistake Proofed Crate Allows Fork Lift Access From All Sides



Crate Interior – HW Damage

Error Prevention Action:


Root Cause Analysis identified the problem was due to poor crate design NOT fork lift operator negligence. The operator was unloading the crate from a panel truck and the crate had no fork pockets at the accessible location. The fork lift operator tried to move the crate with the forks & accidentally pierced the crate and damaged flight HW.

Corrective Action: The crate was redesigned to accommodate appropriate access.

Implementation Date: Nov 2007
Location: SDO

Program Specific Metric Focus Example: Event Causes Study -



Program Specific Related Event Causes



Program X Experienced
What Seemed Like An
Unusual Amount Of
Events ... Is Something
Wrong With The
Program ?

Data shows > Not Really ...

ULA & Support Events by Cause
(2008-Present)



Causes	Examples	Avoid / Eliminate Via AESOP Huddle Focus
A - Assignment	Procedure lacks detail	Assignment Clear?, Complete?, Risks? <small>© Error Prevention Institute</small>
E - Equipment	Equipment / Tooling broken, inadequate	Equipment What?, Available?, Working? <small>© Error Prevention Institute</small>
O - Obstacle	Mother Nature – Hurricane, Rain	Obstacles Potential Problems?, Look Ahead? <small>© Error Prevention Institute</small>
P - Personnel	Intentionally not following procedure	Personnel Who?, Experienced?, Risks? Review I'm SAFE: Illness, Medication, Stress, Alcohol, Fatigue, Eating <small>© Error Prevention Institute</small>

**Program Specific Related Event Cause "Signature"
Matches the Overall ULA 2008-2009 Event Cause Signature**



Error Prevention Opportunity: EP-OPP09-008 Spotter Assignment / Task Not Clearly or Consistently Described

Opportunity:

Program: Atlas/Delta

Location: All ULA

Date Identified: 11/3/2009

Identified By: EPC

POTENTIAL FOR:	
Flight HW Damage ?	Y
Personnel Injury ?	Y
Support HW Damage ?	Y
Schedule Delay ?	Y

Causes:

- Spotter Assignments not well defined
- Spotter Tasks not clearly or consistently described
- Spotters not aware of the importance of their task

HAZARD:

Numerous ULA Events are attributed to spotters and spotter related operations.
Spotters do not always STOP operations appropriately to prevent Events.

Support Provided:

- Badges Cost about \$2000

Solution – Implemented (3/2010):

Spotter AESOP™ Huddle Guide Badge

Spotter AESOP™ Huddle Guide

Assignment:
Task: What task is being performed? Are spotter requirements documented? What are spotters watching for? When does the spotter's job start and end?
Location: Where do spotters need to be physically? Where do spotters need to focus their attention?
Communication: Who do spotters communicate with? How do spotters communicate (verbally, hand signals, radio)? What commands does the spotter need to make? What commands does the spotter need to understand or respond to? Discuss Triple STOP Command (back of card).

Equipment: Does the spotter require specific equipment?
Communication Aids: Radio, Whistle?
Visual Aids: Flashlight, Reflective Vest, Signal Flags?
PPE: Gloves, Eye, or Hearing Protection?

Situation:
Overall Assessment: Go – Ragged Edge – Stop

Obstacles: What potential problems could the spotter encounter? What physical obstacles are present?

Personnel: Do spotters understand the task? Are they comfortable and willing to perform task? Are they able to perform task (availability, physical ability, clear line of sight)?

Spotters Have A Very Important Job:
Spotters are required when operators cannot see their intended path of travel. Spotters are directly responsible for the safety of the hardware.

Spotter Hazards:
Be sure spotters are not exposed to hazards such as suspended loads.

STOP Considerations:
Discuss Triple STOP Command vs. similar commands (Halt, Whoa, Wait). Spotters shall use Triple STOP Command whenever they are:

- Unsure of anything
- Uncomfortable (Pinch)
- Confused or have a question
- Distracted
- Unable to see the objective
- Overwhelmed
- Uncomfortable
- Physically tired, thirsty, hot, cold, weak
- Mentally tired, confused, unsafe, worried, overwhelmed, bored

Use the Conservative Response Rule™:
If there is any doubt about clearance or anything else, shout
"STOP – STOP – STOP!"

ULA™

AESOP™ and the Conservative Response Rule™ are federally protected trademarks of the Error Prevention Institute, Inc.
© 2000 Error Prevention Institute, Inc., 888-598-8715, all rights reserved.

Implementation Plan:

- Badge Drafts Reviewed and Approved by each site
- 1000 badges printed & distributed
- Badge Availability Announced In PPD Attention To Detail Weekly Email (3/11/2010)
- Spotter Training topic included in Vendor Access Training at Decatur

Note: EPI Reviewed and Approved This Concept

Protective Covers Can Become Drop Hazards

Each Mishap & Event provides an opportunity for ULA to learn lessons that help prevent future Mishaps. The following two events demonstrate how protective covers (designed to prevent fragile components from impacts and contact damage) can become drop hazards that may damage other components. These events also demonstrate velcro fasteners are subject to wear and fatigue.

Background: Protective Covers Can Become Drop Hazards -

EVENT08-089; Protective Cover Drop, Delta IV, CCAFS, November 10, 2008:

While opening the Port Common Booster Core Engine Section to perform daily work, we discovered the bottom half of the lower hydraulic accumulator protective non-flight cover (P/N: 1C86442) had come lose from its velcro fasteners and fallen approximately 8 feet into the main engine blanket below. The 2.2 lb cover half is made of aluminum. Fortunately, no personnel or hardware was damaged.

EVENT08-096; Protective Cover Drop, Delta IV, Decatur, December 3, 2008:

While rotating a Delta IV 2nd Stage during production, velcro fasteners on a COPV protective cover gave way allowing the cover half to fall and strike a composite x-brace and then fall to the factory floor. Fortunately, no personnel or hardware was damaged.

EVENT08-089



EVENT08-096



Error Prevention Actions:

- Recognize protective covers as potential drop hazards.
- Realize velcro can and does wear out and weaken with use.
- Add velcro attach point inspection steps to protective cover related procedures.
- Replace worn velcro with new material or more robust fasteners.
- Design protective covers with mechanical fasteners / attach points.
- ALWAYS MAKE SURE IT IS RIGHT

Transportation Height Poles Hazard

Each Mishap & Event provides an opportunity for ULA to learn lessons that help prevent future Mishaps. This Bulletin identifies an event where the height poles used in transporting over roads failed and caused contact with an overpass.

EVENT08-103 –A RS-68 engine was being transported from Decatur to Stennis Space Center by one of our vendors, R.J. Langley. During transport, the height pole on the lead car slipped. The lead car pulled off the road and the pole went under the overpass, but when the truck went under, the engine's trailer contacted the overpass.

The height pole used a "grip" or compression hold to keep the pole in place. As time goes on, age and wear lessen the effectiveness of this hold.

The solution to this problem is to switch to a height pole that employs bolts to lock the pole in place to ensure no height change during transportation.

This has been instituted in PO-885 "Over the Road Transportation Requirements for Oversized Loads."

4.5.1 Pole Extensions

- a) Use standard pole equipment for all pilot cars. Verify pole height prior to transport.

Verify height pole is pinned and secure in order to prevent slippage during transit.



Photos courtesy of RSA Network Inc.

Error Prevention Actions:

- Recognize the types of transportation height poles your department uses.
- Replace out of date poles that do not have positive pin locking features
- Verify that the locking mechanisms used on these poles are in good condition every time they are used.
- ALWAYS MAKE SURE IT IS RIGHT

Understand & Identify Hand Force Only Requirements

Background: The following Event demonstrates how the use of tools on equipment intended for “Hand Force Only” can result in damaged hardware and could result in personnel injury.

EVENT09-013: February 2009, VAFB Delta IV, Test Valve Adapter Damage:

Following a Hydraulic Spin Start Accumulator operation at the VAFB Delta IV launch table, a valve in a pressurized nitrogen system needed to be secured (closed). The small Schrader hand valve requires three turns to close. The valve was sticking so the technician placed a wrench on the valve to add leverage. The extra torque broke the valve’s handle and stem. Since the system was under pressure the valve handle and stem shot across the room. Fortunately no personnel or adjacent flight hardware was struck and injured by the valve pieces.



EVENT09-013 Schrader Valve



Use Hand Force Only

Error Prevention Actions:

- **IDENTIFY** “Hand Force Only” operations as potentially hazardous via **WARNING** statements in associated procedures.
- **DISCUSS** the presence of “Hand Force Only” parts and their associated hazards during pre-operation AESOP huddles.
- **LABEL** “Hand Force Only” parts with appropriate **WARNING** labels.
- **STOP And ASK** when uncertain if parts are appropriate to manipulate via tools.
- **ALWAYS MAKE SURE IT IS RIGHT**

Floor Hazards

Each Mishap & Event provides an opportunity for ULA to learn lessons that help prevent future Mishaps. The following two Events demonstrate how floor conditions can create hazards or risks that may cause personnel injury or flight hardware damage.

EVENT08-067 - In September 2008, one of Harlingen's wheel mounted work platforms moved unexpectedly during use and contacted an adjacent work stand. Analysis indicated uneven / sloping floors and lack of brake use as root causes and wheel chocks were chosen as a corrective action.

EVENT08-081 - In October 2008, the work platform moved again during use and came into contact with an adjacent work stand. Analysis indicated that wheel chocks alone were not sufficient to stabilize the platform on the uneven floors, and new floor interfaces were developed as a corrective action. This time, corrective actions were tested and verified before the work platform was returned to use.

NOTE: Every ULA facility has a floor – all floors may feature hazards.

Typical Floor Hazards

- Floors that slope
- Floors that are uneven or not smooth due to bumps, cracks, holes,
- Floor seams that do not match up
- Floors with damaged surfaces (i.e. pitting, peeling or loose floor coverings)
- Floor mounted features (i.e. electrical outlets or drains)
- Raised and open floors
- Wet or slippery floors



Error Prevention Actions:

- Be Aware there are many floor hazards
- Verify floors are clear and safe before conducting operations
- Post Warnings in areas where floor hazards exist
- Notify management / facilities when floors need repair
- ALWAYS MAKE SURE IT IS RIGHT

Socket Wrench Drop Hazards

Each Mishap & Event provides an opportunity for ULA to learn lessons that help prevent future Mishaps. This Bulletin identifies several events where socket tips disengaged from wrench handles and fell into, onto and or near flight hardware.


EVENT08-095 - In December 2008, a crows foot socket wrench attachment separated from a torque wrench and fell 10 feet in Decatur's production facility. During the fall, the crows foot struck the Delta IV vehicle's structure and caused minor damage.

Previous Events - In February of 2003 (NM03-04), a socket tip disengaged from a tethered socket wrench in the Atlas VIF at CCAFS and fell 30 feet coming to rest in the Atlas vehicle raceway.

In November of 2005 (NM05-148) a socket tip disengaged from a socket wrench during Atlas Centaur processing and fell thru an opening in the CCAFS VIF deck coming to rest on a lower deck level. This socket did not contact flight hardware.

Root Cause Analysis determined socket tips are not always compatible with the positive locking features present on the associated wrench handles.

Sockets and wrenches from dissimilar manufacturers (i.e. Craftsman and Snap On) may not have compatible locking features.



Wrench Tip Lock Feature Must Engage Socket Lock Feature To Stay Secure

Error Prevention Actions:

- **Be Aware** socket tips represent a drop hazard that has affected both Atlas and Delta programs in the recent past.
- **Verify** socket tips lock firmly onto associated socket wrenches prior to use above or near flight hardware and/or personnel.
- **Secure** sockets via tape or other means to guarantee they will not disengage.
- **ALWAYS MAKE SURE IT IS RIGHT**

Potential Error: Damage to Flight Hardware Due To Loose Hardware and Loose Fasteners In Shipping Container

System Safety
Error Prevention Success Story
EP-SUCCESS10-010

EVENT10-034: Loose hardware and mold was discovered inside inbound Carbon Overwrapped Pressure Vessel (COPV) shipping containers at ULA's Harlingen facility. Mold and loose hardware represent the following hazards:

- Hardware contamination via Foreign Object (FO) exposure
- Hardware contact / impact hazards




Harlingen Techs Discover Mold & Loose HW Inside Shipping Container

ERROR PREVENTION ACTION:
Harlingen personnel documented incident via a FLASH - FLASH distributed enterprise wide.

Harlingen Techs Write & Submit A FLASH Which Is Distributed Enterprise Wide

SUCCESS: Decatur Technicians read the Flash and carefully examined two recently received COPV crates. Loose fasteners in both crates were discovered BEFORE the COPV's were unpacked.



3 Days Later ... Decatur Techs Read FLASH & Discover Similar Hazards BEFORE Processing HW

Lessons Learned: FLASH Notices are effective mechanisms for communicating hazards across the ULA Enterprise.

Implementation Date March, 2010
Location: ULA Enterprise Wide

Identify the Hazards



Recognizing When Others are Taking a Risk is Easy

Recognizing When You are About to Take a Risk Requires Both Effort & Practice

STOP & THINK Before You Act

STOP When Risks/ Hazards Exist



Picture used with permission from thereifixedit.com;
There, I Fixed It™ is a trademark of Pet Holdings, Inc. © 2007-2010 Pet Holdings, Inc.

Great News!

Errors CAN Be Prevented




ULA has an EP Process in Place ...
& Statistics to Prove it Works

Questions



Backup Slides Follow






AESOP™ Huddle

AESOP™ Defined... An Error Prevention technique used to ensure that all personnel associated with an operation are familiar with & understand their roles & responsibilities in the operation & that risks of failure are identified & mitigated.

AESOP™ Key Points

- A Structured Pause BEFORE a Task to Verify
 - ✓ Assignment
 - ✓ Equipment
 - ✓ Obstacles
 - ✓ Personnel
 - ✓ Situation
- May Be a Built-in Procedure Step
- Gets Everyone Focused on the Task
- Allows Individuals to Consider the Potential for Problems & Speak Up
- Used Daily at ULA
- All ULA Employees Receive AESOP™ Training




AESOP...What does it stand for?

Everyone is very busy these days. Corporate downsizing and restructuring have left the typical employee wearing many hats. Even smaller organizations are trying to do more with less.

This pressure to do more with less time and resources can lead to errors and accidents as we rush from one task to another. We don't pause for a moment to make sure we aren't missing something. Written procedures and multiple checklists may give the appearance of being in control, but often our minds are not on the current task. Additionally, a lack of

communication between the individuals involved may result in critical problems being overlooked.

AESOP is a tool we can use to identify all risks prior to making a decision. It helps us to fully understand the problem causing potential of combined risk factors. It is a powerful tool to break people's tunnel vision lock on whatever they are doing so they can make sure all the bases are covered. It is also a final opportunity for anyone who has reservations to speak up.



AESOP reminds us to look at all aspects of the big picture.

ASSIGNMENT

- What is the true goal we are pursuing?
- What are we supposed to accomplish?
- Do we need more information?
- Have we been sidetracked by other problems?
- Has our focus been diverted?

EQUIPMENT

- What do we need to do the job?
- Is it available?
- Is it appropriate for the task?
- Is it working properly?

SITUATION

- What is the overall situation based on all the other parameters?
- Green = Good to Go
- Yellow = Proceed with caution
- Red = Stop until risk can be reduced
- A problem may not seem to add much risk, but combined with other risk factors, it may be the straw that broke the camel's back.

OBSTACLES

- Are there any obstacles to completing this task with what we have available?
- Are there any other problems we haven't addressed?

PERSONNEL

- Who do we need?
- Who is assigned to this task?
- What is their experience level?
- Is each person properly trained?
- Ask each person to use the I'M SAFE checklist to assess if they are ready to take on this task. (More detail on I'M SAFE checklist in a future huddle.)

© 2000 Error Prevention Institute, Inc.

AESOP™ is a federally protected trademark of the Error Prevention Institute, Inc. ©2000 Error Prevention Institute, Inc., 888-0599-8715, all rights reserved.

Why Do We STOP ?



- Obstacle Encountered
- Unsure of Assignment
- Uncomfortable with Situation
- Confused
- Distracted
- Overwhelmed
- Address Needs
- Tired
- . . .




STOP Command



**Any ULA Process Can Be STOPPED at Any Time
At ULA ... STOP is Always an Option**

**A STOP Command May Be Issued by Any Process Participant
(e.g., Defense Contract Management Agency, Supplier, or ULA
Employee)**

**When the Stop Command is Issued, All Associated Work Must
Stop Until Authority to Proceed is Provided by the Person in
Charge**



J. Allison | 55

Operational Fishbone Process

